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In the late 1990s, government policy in Bangladesh shifted in favor of increased 
public foodgrain stocks, setting official minimum stock targets of 1.0 to 1.2 million tons, 
as compared to operational targets of about 700 to 800 thousand metric tons in the early 
1990s.  Because no mechanism for stock rotation involving simultaneous buying and 
selling grain at a wholesale level exists, higher stock levels with no increase in 
distribution led to an increase in average age of stocks and problems of stock quality 
deterioration.  This paper extends earlier analyses of stock policy by focusing on a key 
aspect of stock management in Bangladesh: the economic costs of stock quality 
deterioration in storage, including the implicit costs to recipients of Public Food 
Distribution System (PFDS) foodgrain.   
Using market prices to value procurement and distribution of rice and wheat, 
consumer and producer subsidies accounted for 57.4 and 20.9 percent, respectively, of 
net outlay in 2000/01.  Implicit losses to rice consumers due to quality deterioration were 
significant in 2000/01: about 1.05 billion Taka (about 19 million dollars), equal to 10.9 
percent of total net outlay on rice of the PFDS.  Analysis of the costs and benefits of 
alternative stock targets based on calculations of the minimum age of stock on a monthly 
basis indicates that moderate increases in the size of stock (e.g. 200 thousand tons), lead 
to only small net marginal outlays.  However, unless procurement and distribution are 
also raised, the age and quality of the stock for distribution deteriorates, resulting in 
significant losses to program recipients.      
1 
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Since the late 1990s, there has been a gradual shift in Government of Bangladesh 
policy in favor of increased public foodgrain stocks.  In the mid-1990s, the operational 
stock target of the Public Foodgrain Distribution System (PFDS) was effectively in the 
range of 700 to 800 thousand metric tons.  However, sharp declines in food stocks in 
early 1998 following an unexpectedly poor aman harvest in November/December 1997 
and shortages of wheat stocks after the floods in July through September 1998 have led 
many to conclude that higher levels of stocks were needed.  The official government 
stock target was raised to 1.0 million metric tons in mid-1998, and the mid-term 
evaluation of the five-year plan in 2000 included a statement that the target level would 
be 1.2 million metric tons. 
The determination of appropriate stocks levels involves several aspects.  Working 
stocks are needed for smooth operation of the PFDS, which distributed 1.9 million metric 
tons of foodgrain in FY 1999/2000 and 1.77 million metric tons of foodgrain in 2000/01. 
Emergency foodgrain reserves, not necessarily in addition to working stocks, are also 
needed to alleviate the effects of possible relief and market stabilization needs in the  
event of major disasters (floods, cyclones) and crop shortages.  Holding stocks involves  
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real financial costs, however, including those involved in storage losses, and construction 
and maintenance of storage facilities, as well as the costs involved in rotating stocks 
through the PFDS.  The costs of stock deterioration, borne by recipients of PFDS 
foodgrain, are generally not included in financial analyses of the costs of holding stock, 
though. 
Several empirical modeling exercises have focused on analysis of stocks and their 
implications for price stabilization (Goletti, Ahmed and Chowdhury, 1991; Brennan, 
1995; Goletti and Rich 1998).   These analyses have highlighted several major lessons, 
including the importance of clarifying objectives (price stabilization, working stocks for 
the PFDS), and that lowest costs can be achieved through using rice for rice price 
stabilization and wheat for foodgrain distribution to the poor.  These analyses have also 
emphasized that ￿optimal stock￿ should not be thought of as a single number, but as a 
path of stock levels over time that depend on policy regime and policy objectives.  In 
particular, significant savings can be achieved through reliance on international trade 
(importing in times of shortage and exporting in times of surplus) to supplement 
moderate levels of stocks.
3   
This paper extends the earlier analyses by focusing on a key aspect of stock 
management in Bangladesh: the economic costs of stock quality deterioration in storage, 
including the implicit costs to recipients of PFDS foodgrain.  These issues are important  
in Bangladesh because no mechanism for stock rotation involving simultaneous buying 
and selling grain at a wholesale level exists; rather foodgrain distribution occurs almost 
                                                 
3 Private sector imports of rice following the 1998 floods helped stabilize rice prices at no cost to the public 
exchequer, keeping domestic prices from rising above import parity levels (Dorosh, 2000).  See also 
Dorosh, Shahabuddin and Farid (forthcoming) for a more extended review of stock modeling exercises in 





exclusively through direct distribution in targeted programs or limited sales at a retail 
level.  Thus, excess procurement following bumper harvests or excessive government 
imports following crop shortfalls can lead to large accumulations of aging stock.
4     
Section 2 of this paper presents a brief review of government policy and actual 
levels of stocks consumers.  In Section 3, we outline an accounting framework that 
includes the value of grain to recipients of PFDS foodgrain, and give estimates of the 
costs and benefits of the PFDS in recent years.  Section 4 analyzes alternative options for 
stocks and the cost of the PFDS in terms of costs and benefits to consumers and 
producers.  The last section contains policy implications and conclusions.  
 
2.  PFDS STOCK POLICY AND HISTORICAL STOCK LEVELS 
 
PFDS stock policy and stock levels have changed over time along with the overall 
size of the PFDS and the major distribution channels (Figures 2.1, 2.2).  In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, PFDS total annual distribution ranged from 2.16 to 2.97 million tons, 
with much of the foodgrain distributed through ration channels, involving subsidized 
sales of foodgrain to ration cardholders.  PFDS gross stock levels in 1989/90 and 1990/91 
averaged 1.13 million tons,
5 equal to 6.02 times monthly average distribution in these 
years (Table 2.1).   
                                                 
4 India has experienced similar problems.  In the absence of a market mechanism to rotate stocks, public 
distribution has failed to keep pace with rising procurement, resulting in a large increase in the volume and 
average age of stocks.   
5 Unless otherwise noted, all foodgrain stocks figures in this report indicate net stocks, i.e. gross stocks less 
a deduction for foodgrain in transit.  In 2000/2001, 15 thousand tons of rice and 88 thousand tons of wheat 





Major reforms in the PFDS took place in the early 1990s with the elimination of 
major rationing channels (Statutory Rationing and Rural Rationing) and greater emphasis 
on targeted distribution.  Total distribution was reduced to an average of only 1.53 
million tons from 1993/94 through 1996/97.  Stock levels were reduced as well, with 
average annual stocks ranging from 577 to 950 thousand tons over this period.   
Total public foodgrain stocks since the 1998 floods, however, have increased 
substantially to an annual average of 1.35 million tons in FY 1999/2000 and 1.05 million 
tons in 2000/01.  This very large PFDS stock build-up occurred mainly because of 
delayed import arrivals and relatively high levels of domestic procurement in response to 
falling market prices immediately after the harvest of consecutive bumper crops in boro 
(1999), aman (1999/2000), boro (2000), aman  (2000/01) and latest boro (2001).  About 
604 thousand metric tons of rice was procured from the bumper boro harvest in 1999, and 
this, along with delayed arrivals of food aid for flood rehabilitation led to a sharp increase 
in stocks.  Stocks peaked at 1.63 million metric tons in December 1999 (654 thousand 
metric tons of rice and 976 thousand metric tons of wheat).
6   
 
                                                 
6 Subsequently, careful management of the PFDS, including cancellation of commercial wheat imports, 
reductions of wheat distribution and increases in rice distribution reduced the stock level and essentially 






Table 2.1￿Annual PFDS Distribution and Gross Foodgrain Stock 
 
Year  Average monthly stock Avg monthly off-take Monthly average stock to 
  (000 tons)  (000 tons)  Monthly average off-take 
      
 Rice  Wheat Total Rice Wheat Total Rice Wheat  Total 
                  
1989/90 660  541 1201 56 124 180 11.73 4.36  6.66 
        
1990/91 549  513 1062 81 117 198 6.78 4.40  5.38 
        
1991/92 491  324  815 63 132 195 7.76 2.45  4.17 
        
1992/93 594  592 1186 40 50 89 15.01 11.88 13.27 
        
1993/94 258  475  733 29 86 115 8.85 5.55  6.39 
        
1994/95 177  400  577 27 104 131 6.46 3.86  4.40 
        
1995/96 401  488  889 49 100 150 8.13 4.88  5.95 
        
1996/97 551  398  949 62 54 116 8.95 7.31  8.18 
        
1997/98 297  455  752 44 91 135 6.74 5.00  5.57 
        
1998/99 424  562  986 44 134 178 9.60 4.20  5.54 
        
1999/00 666  682 1348 73 85 158 9.12 7.99  8.51 
        
2000/01 643  406 1049 82 65 147 7.84 6.26  7.14 
 





Table 2.2￿Periods of Low and High Stocks in the 1990s 
 
    
   Average monthly stock  Avg. monthly distribution  Stock to distribution 
Periods   (000 tons)    (000 tons)  (000 tons) 
   Rice  Wheat  Total Rice Wheat Total Rice  Wheat Total
Low stock periods    
1994/95 (Sep-Apr)  130  370 500 33 113 145 3.98  3.29 3.44
      
1997/98 (Dec-Apr)  205  313 518 58 135 193 3.55  2.31 2.68
      
1998/99 (Aug-Oct)  400  162 562 55 46 101 7.23  3.54 5.56
      
High stock periods     
1996/97 (Jul-Jun)  554  309 863 53 84 136 10.54  3.70 6.34
      
1999/00 (Jul-Jun)  662  602 1263 73 85 158 9.07  7.05 7.98
      
2000/01 (Jul-Apr)  682  310 993 68 127 194 10.05  2.45 5.11
      
Source: FPMU data and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
PERIODS OF EXCESSIVELY LOW STOCKS 
During the 1990s, there were three episodes when stock levels were precariously 
low, at approximately 205 thousand tons or less of rice or wheat (Table 2.2).  The first 
episode occurred from September 1994 through April 1995, when aman procurement 
failed because drought severely damaged the 1994/95 aman crop, and government 
commercial imports were delayed by up to 15 months because of failure of suppliers to 
deliver according to contract schedules.   
A second period of low stocks, from December 1997 through April 1998, 
followed an unexpectedly poor aman harvest in November/ December 1997.  In that year, 





widespread prevalence of empty husks (chita), and about 7.35 percent reduction in the 
aman harvest.  Prices rapidly rose above the fixed procurement price, so that regular 
procurement failed.  Difficulties with contracts for government commercial imports 
limited international procurement as well, and rice stocks fell to only 137 thousand tons 
in March 1998.
7  
Stocks were also uncomfortably low from August through October 1998, when 
widespread floods destroyed aman rice seedlings, ultimately reducing the November/ 
December 1998 harvest.  In response to the appeals for aid in late August 1998, donors 
pledged 1.083 million tons of foodgrain for flood relief, but major food aid arrivals were 
not expected until November.   
Thus, with only 231 thousand tons of wheat stocks, expansion of distribution 
through the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) was limited to 64 thousand tons per month 
(half rice and half wheat) instead of the 141 thousand tons of wheat per month proposed 
by the World Food Programme (WFP).
8   
 
PERIODS OF EXCESSIVELY HIGH STOCKS  
Though the situation often appears less urgent than for low stock periods, high 
stock periods can be problematic as well, because of quality deterioration of foodgrain in 
storage.  Although it is technically possible to store rice and wheat for periods exceeding 
one year, significant deterioration in rice quality (especially discoloration) often occurs in 
rice stored for more than six months in PFDS godowns.  Wheat storage problems are less 
                                                 
7 Shortly thereafter, in April 1998, the Prime Minister announced an official stock target of 1.0 million 
metric tons. 
8 Subsequent food aid arrivals enabled a large expansion in Food For Work in early 1999, however.  See 





severe, particularly in government silos, though in recent years there have been serious 
quality problems with imported wheat stored more than six months, as well.   
There have been three periods of excessively high stocks since the mid-1990s 
(Table 2.2).  The first period, from July 1996 through June 1997, average rice stocks 
were 554 thousand tons, while average monthly rice distribution was only 53 thousand 
tons.  Thus, rice stocks were on average equal to 10.54 months of rice distribution.  This 
situation occurred because of the delayed delivery of 491 thousand tons of rice tendered 
by the government in 1994/95 that did not arrive until 1995/96.   
The other two periods of high stocks followed the 1998 floods.  Average monthly 
rice stocks exceeded 600 thousand tons in both 1999/2000 and the first eight months of 
2000/2001, equal to 9.07 and 10.05 months of distribution, respectively.  Wheat stocks 
were also high in 1999/2000, on average equal to 7.0 months of distribution, and some 
imported wheat (apparently already old when it arrived in Bangladesh) severely 
deteriorated in quality. Fiscal year closing PFDS gross stock for 1999/2000 (30
th June, 
2000) was 1.091 million tons.  While currently, the end-June 2001 gross PFDS stocks 
stood at 865 thousand metric tons (420 thousand metric tons of rice and 445 thousand 
metric tons of wheat).  
  These problems of stock deterioration during periods of high stocks can be 
overcome through increases in public distribution.  As is shown in sections 3 and 4, 
public distribution of foodgrains typically involves large subsidies.  An alternative 
approach, open market sales at a wholesale level through public auction (and possibly 
simultaneous domestic procurement through competitive tender) would enable the 





SEASONAL NET PFDS STOCK TARGETS  
The experiences of the 1998 flood and other periods of production shortfalls 
suggest the importance of minimum stock targets.  Because of seasonal fluctuations in 
distribution and in domestic procurement, however, requirements for both emergency and 
working stocks fluctuate throughout the year.  There are four key points during the year 
at which minimum end-stock levels are important: July, November, January and March 
(Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3￿Seasonal Net PFDS Stock Targets 
  (000 metric tons) 
  Rice Wheat Total 
  
July  400 300 830 
   
November  300 300 800 
   
January  400 350 850 
   
March  300 350 700 
 
 
Source:   Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  *  Stock targets assume annual PFDS distribution of approximately 850 thousand tons rice and 
950 thousand tons wheat, with distribution channels similar to actual distribution in 2000/01. 
 
 
Sufficient stocks for possibly emergency distribution in the event of a major flood 
are needed at the end of July.  At least 830 thousand tons of foodgrain are needed to 
allow for up to 600 thousand tons of emergency relief distribution from August through 
November.  Given that large amounts of boro rice are generally procured to support 
producer prices from May through July, at least 400 thousand tons of the total 830 





emergency needs and normal program distribution.  Generally, emergency food aid, if 
needed, can be expected to supplement government stocks by December. 
End-November stock targets are also important because of the possible failure of 
aman procurement, as in November/December 1997 when there was a serious aman 
shortfall caused by a short hidden drought that resulted in widespread prevalence of 
unfilled grains (chita).  Even lesser shortfalls have caused aman procurement to fail as 
domestic prices rose above procurement price levels (Dorosh and Shahabuddin, 1999; 
Dorosh, Shahabuddin and Farid, forthcoming). 
Given possible needs for rice market stabilization in the event of poor aman 
harvest, the suggested end-January stock target is 400 thousand tons.  In the event of a 
failed domestic aman fixed-price procurement, the GOB could procure rice domestically 
through open tenders, initiate GOB imports of rice through commercial channels, and 
encourage private sector imports (Dorosh, 2001; Dorosh, Shahabuddin and Farid, 
forthcoming).   
Government procurement through fixed-price domestic procurement, commercial 
imports, food aid and domestic tenders should be sufficient to achieve a minimum level 
of at least 700 thousand tons of stock at the end of March, (at least 300 thousand tons of 
rice and 350 thousand tons of wheat).  Stock targets are lowest for end-March since boro 
and wheat harvests and procurement (which are far less uncertain than aman harvests and 
procurement) begin in April. 
As shown in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, these suggested seasonal stock targets have 
generally been maintained throughout the 1989 through 2001 period, except for the crisis 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.  FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PFDS 
OPERATION  
 
Government of Bangladesh financial accounts for the PFDS record the receipts 
and outlays of the Ministry of Food.  These accounts, however, record only financial 
flows at ￿book values￿ of the commodities and do not include adjustments for changes in 
prices due to changes in market conditions or due to changes in stock quality.  To assess 
the costs and the size and distribution of the benefits of the PFDS requires an accounting 
system that values grain at market prices. 
 
GOB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS FOR THE PFDS   
The GOB financial accounts for the PFDS show outlays and receipts from the 
standpoint of the Ministry of Food (Table 3.1).  Outlays include domestic and 
international commercial procurement, as well as operational costs.  Food aid is also 
shown as an expenditure of the Ministry of Food in the government accounts, being 
purchased from the ￿foreign aid￿ account.  Receipts include transfer payments for 
foodgrain received from other GOB ministries (such as the Ministry of Disaster 
Management and Relief and the Ministry of Education). 
The value of foodgrain ￿purchased￿ by other ministries for their programs 
involving food distribution is calculated using the ￿economic price￿ of the foodgrain.  
This price represents the full financial cost of the foodgrain supplied, calculated using the 
average procurement price during the year, plus handling and administrative costs.  This 
book value, ￿economic price￿ does not necessarily have any relation to the market price 





Since the expenditures of other Ministries for foodgrain are considered as part of 
development or relief expenditures and are valued using the economic price, there is 
technically no subsidy involved.  Thus, the official GOB food subsidy is calculated only 
for distribution through sales channels, such as Open Market Sales, and Essential 
Priorities (sales to the military and other groups), and is equal to difference between the 
sales price and the economic price multiplied by the quantity of grain sold in each 
channel.  For 2000/01, the estimated food subsidy (for rice and wheat distribution only) 
was 2.58 billion Taka.
9   Intra-governmental transfers, (the book costs of all non-sales 
channel distribution apart from Food For Work), were equal to 12.44 billion Taka, 4.8 
times as large as the official food subsidy on rice and wheat.
10   
 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE PFDS AT MARKET PRICES  
Estimating the actual value of the PFDS to producers and consumers requires an 
accounting system based on market prices, not on financial prices of the GOB.  Market 
prices change throughout the year, however, affecting the value of procurement and 
distribution, as well as the value of stocks.  Valuing stocks, procurement and distribution 
and market prices each month permits an analysis of the direct costs and benefits (apart 
from the effects on price stabilization) of the PFDS (Table 3.2).
11  
                                                 
9  Subsidies on the sales of vegetable oil are not considered in this report. 
10 Food for Work expenditures are not counted here as part of the food subsidy because they represent wage 
payments to program participants.   






Table 3.1￿PFDS Financial Costs, Actual 2000/01 (billion taka) 
 
 
  Rice Wheat   Total
  
OUTLAY    
Domestic Procurement  10.58 2.36    12.94
Food Aid  0.46 4.41    4.86
Commercial Imports  0.00 0.00    0.00
Marketing and Establishment Costs  1.71 1.51    3.22
Total Outlay  12.75 8.28   21.03
  
RECEIPTS    
Ration Channels  0.38 0.57    0.96
Food For Work  4.69 3.04    7.73
Change in Value of Stock  -1.92 -0.76    -2.68
  
Total Net Outlay  9.59 5.43   15.02
  
Subsidy on Sales Channels  1.53 1.05    2.58
    
Intra-GOB Transfers (Non-Sales, Non-FFW)  8.06 4.38    12.44
  
 





Table 3.2￿PFDS Subsidies on Rice, Actual 2000/01, (FY 2000/2001 Prices) 
 















Sources of Foodgrain    
Opening Stock (at previous year’s 
end price) 
563 14.75 8.31 563 12.21 6.88 1.43
Opening Stock (at current year’s 
end price) 
563 14.91 8.40 563 11.38 6.41 1.99
Change in Value of Opening Stock  0.09   -0.47  0.56
      
Domestic Rice Procurement  823 12.86 10.58 823 9.71  7.99  2.59
 plus Marketing, Management cost   823 1.32 1.09 823 1.46  1.20  -0.11
Food Aid Rice Imports  32 14.30 0.46 32 14.30  0.46  0.00
 plus Marketing, Management Cost  32 2.47 0.08 32 2.47  0.08  0.00
Govt Commercial Rice Imports  0 14.30 0.00 0 14.30  0.00  0.00
 plus Marketing, Management Cost  0 2.47 0.00 0 2.47  0.00  0.00
Fixed Costs / Unit of Procurement  855 0.63 0.54     0.54
Total Cost of Procurement  855 14.91 12.75 855 11.38  9.73  3.02
    
Uses of Foodgrain    
Rice Distribution
a 984 5.16 5.08 984 10.34  10.17  -5.09
  Sales Channels  129 2.98 0.38 129 10.34  1.33  -0.95
  Non-Sales, Non-FFW   540 14.91 8.06 540 10.34  5.59  -5.59
  Food For Work (FFW)  315 14.91 4.69 315 10.34  3.25  1.44
    
Official Storage Losses
b 15 14.91 0.22 15 9.88  0.15  0.07
End Stock (at current year’s end 
price) 
420 14.91 6.26 420 11.38 4.78 1.48
    
Consumer Subsidy on Rice      9.59
Official PFDS Consumer Subsidy 
(sales channels only)
 c 
1.53   
 
a Market value is calculated using a (15 percent) quality-discounted price of Tk/kg 9.93 for distribution of 
rice stocks more than seven months old, (706 thousand tons), and a market price of Tk/kg 11.38 for rice 
less than seven months old (278 thousand tons).   
b Market value of stock loss assumes a (15 percent) quality-discounted price of Tk/kg 9.93 for rice stocks 
more than seven months old, (13 thousand tons), and a market price of Tk/kg 11.38 for rice stocks less than 
seven months old (2 thousand tons). 
c Calculated as the difference between the value of distribution at the full financial cost price (14.91 Tk/kg) 
and actual sales receipts. 





For example, in 2000/01, 823 thousand tons of rice were procured domestically at 
a total cost of 12.19 billion Taka
12.  The average cost of domestically procured rice is 
thus 14.81 Tk per kg (Tk.12.86/kg fixed procurement price plus Tk1.95/kg for marketing, 
management etc.).  Given an average market value of rice of 11.17 Tk/kg (Tk 9.71/kg 
producers’ price plus Tk 1.46/kg for marketing, management etc.) during the procurement 
months, the market value of the procured quantity was 9.19 billion Taka.  Thus, the 
subsidy on domestic rice procurement was 3.0 billion Taka, (about 55 million dollars).
13  
Government commercial imports are procured through international tenders at market 
prices. Thus, there is no subsidy involved in the procurement of government commercial 
imports (though distribution of this grain may involve a subsidy).  The market value of 
imported food aid is calculated as unit cost of government commercial imports times the 
quantity of food aid.  Note that food aid has a negotiated book price higher than the 
market price of commercial imports.    
The value of foodgrain to consumers is calculated using the market price in the 
month in which the foodgrain is distributed.  Moreover, rice in excess of 7 months old 
and wheat in excess of 8 months old is assumed to have a market value equal to only 85 
percent of the market price of new foodgrain.
14   
                                                 
12 These non-sales channels include Food For Education (shown as a sale of grain from the Ministry of 
Food to the Ministry of Education) and relief channels (generally shown as a sale of grain from the 
Ministry of Food to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Relief). 
13 This subsidy on domestic procurement does not necessarily accrue to farmers.  For example, in a 
representative sample survey on rice procurement following the 1997/98 boro harvest, almost 90 percent of 
the rice was procured from traders, instead of directly from farmers (Shahabuddin and Islam, 1999).   
Dorosh, Shahabuddin and Farid (forthcoming) argue that procurement from traders nonetheless has the 
same (small) impact on market prices as does an equivalent procurement from farmers.   
14 Assuming that foodgrain stocks are rotated on a first-in first-out basis, the amount of stock at the end of 
period t that is age x months or greater, can be calculated as the end stock level at time t-x and subtracting 
total distribution from period t-x+1 through period t.  This figure represents the minimum amount of stock 
of age 8 months.  If stock is not rotated on a first-in first-out basis, then the amount of old stock could be 
larger. The 15 percent loss in value of the grain is based on the authors￿ estimates of the market value loss 





Using this framework, the total net outlay of the PFDS can be decomposed to 
show benefits and losses (Table 3.3).
15  The consumer subsidy, calculated as the 
difference between the market price of food and the sales price to consumers multiplied 
by the quantity distributed, is the largest component of the PFDS, accounting for 57.4 
percent of net outlay in 2000/01.  The producer subsidy (3.14 billion Taka, of which 2.59 
billion Taka was for domestic rice producers), accounts for 20.9 percent of total net 
outlays.  Changes in the value of stock due to price effects and quality adjustments 
represent 11.7 percent of net outlays.  The remaining 10.0 percent of net outlays is due to 
excess valuation of food aid and higher marketing costs of the PFDS in comparison with 
the private sector.   
Implicit losses to rice consumers of quality deterioration were significant in 
2000/01: about 1.05 billion Taka (about 19 million dollars), equal to 10.9 percent of total 
net outlay on rice of the PFDS.  Avoiding quality losses requires either increased shelf 
life or quicker stock rotation (through distribution or some form of open market sales).   
                                                 
15 This paper makes no attempt to estimate who actually receives the producer and consumer subsidies.  






Table 3.3￿Decomposition of PFDS Net Outlay, Actual 2000/01 (billion Taka) 
 
Rice Wheat  Total
Total Net Outlay  9.59 5.43  15.02
 
Producer subsidy (at market prices)  2.59 27.0% 0.55 10.2%  3.14 20.9%
 
Excess book value of food aid*  0.00 0.0% 0.71 13.2%  0.71 4.8%
 
Excess marketing costs  0.43 4.5% 0.35 6.4%  0.78 5.2%
 
Consumer subsidy (at market prices)  5.09 53.1% 3.52 64.9%  8.62 57.4%
  Sales Channels  0.95 9.9% 0.70 13.0%  1.65 11.0%
  Non-Sales, Non-FFW  5.59 58.3% 3.46 63.7%  9.05 60.2%
  FFW**  -1.44 -15.0% -0.64 -11.8%  -2.08 -13.8%
 
Change in stock quality and value***  1.48 15.4% 0.29 5.3%  1.77 11.8%
 
Total  9.59 100.0% 5.43 100.0% 15.02 100.0%
 
Notes:  *    Difference between book value of food aid and estimated market value of commercial 
imports. 
**   Negative values for FFW indicate that the market price is below the intra-GOB transfer 
price. 
*** Change in value of stock due to price and quality effects. 





4.  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE PFDS STOCK OPTIONS  
 
The framework outlined in the previous section can facilitate an analysis of the 
benefits and costs of alternative stock policies.  Because quality of foodgrain is an 
important aspect of policy and the GOB currently has no mechanism to rotate stocks 
apart from PFDS distribution, the level of stocks is closely related to the size of the 
PFDS.  Thus, in this section, we analyze various combinations of stock and distribution 
levels, estimating financial costs to the government and overall benefits to producers and 
consumers, (ignoring the possible effects on market price stabilization). 
The base scenario is designed to approximate the size of the PFDS in 2000/01, 
with starting and ending net stocks of rice and wheat (available at the points of 
distribution) each equal to 400 thousand tons, and with total distribution of 1.8 million 
tons, (850 thousand tons of rice and 950 thousand tons of wheat).  Month-by-month 
procurement and distribution in the base scenario (Table 4.1) reflect typical timing and 
levels of actual procurement and distribution occurred in FY 2000/2001 (Table 4.2).
16  
Table 4.1 shows, with near-ideal stock management, only 58 thousand tons of rice more 
than 7 months old is distributed in the base scenario.  No wheat more than 8 months old 
is distributed.   
If stock is increased to 1.0 million tons, but distribution is unchanged under 
Option 1 (Appendix 3), the amount of old stock distributed increases to 336 thousand 
tons of rice and 170 thousand tons of wheat, though net outlay is essentially unaffected 
(Table 4.3).  Thus, quality loss as a percentage of net outlay rises from 0.9 percent in the 
base to 6.5 percent in Option 1 (Table 4.4).   
                                                 





In order to avoid the problems of accumulation of old stock, distribution could be 
increased along with the target stock levels under Option 2.  In this scenario, however, 
there is a large increase in net outlay of 1.63 billion Taka, as increased distribution is 
assumed to take place through non-sales channels.  The marginal benefit to consumers 
(and producers) is rather small, however, (only 0.52 billion Taka) and the marginal 
benefit/cost ratio is only 0.32 (Table 4.4). 
Reducing stock to 0.7 million tons and keeping distribution at 1.8 million tons 
(the level of distribution in the base scenario) under Option 3, has very little effect on 
marginal outlay, but results in a minimum rice and total net stock level of only 202 
thousand tons and 625 thousand tons respectively, at its lowest point during the year. 
Finally, under Option 4, distribution of rice is increased by 50 thousand tons 
relative to the base, and wheat stocks are increased by 50 thousand tons while rice stocks 
are reduced by 50 thousand tons.  As a result of these changes, quality loss in the system 
is greatly reduced because no rice stock reaches 7 months of age.  The marginal net 
outlay of 0.62 billion Taka produces 0.82 billion Taka of benefits and the marginal 
benefit/cost ratio is 1.33 (Table 4.4). 
Thus, costs and benefits of alternative stock targets are closely related to storage 
losses and the levels of distribution required to rotate stocks.  Increasing the size of stock 
by moderate amounts, (e.g. 200 thousand tons in Option 1), leads to only small net 
marginal outlays, but unless procurement and distribution are also raised, the quality of 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3￿Alternative Stock Options  
  Base Option 1 Option 2 Option 3  Option 4
 Net stock (million tons)  0.8  1.0 1.0 0.7  0.8 
 Total distribution (million tons)  1.8  1.8  2.0  1.8  1.85 
Stock available for distribution (’000 tons)  800 1000 1000 700  800
  Rice  400 500 500 350  350
  Wheat  400 500 500 350  450
   
Lowest available in any month (’000 tons)  707 895 975 625  715
  Rice  237 337 392 202  249
  Wheat  376 476 476 326  422
   
Total distribution (’000 tons)  1800 1800 2000 1800  1850
  Rice  850 850 950 850  900
  Wheat  950 950 1050 950  950
   
Distribution of Old Stock (’000 tons)  58 506 520 0  8
          Rice ( >7 months)  58 336 381 0  0
 Wheat ( >8 months)  0 170 139 0  8
   
Total net outlay (billion Taka)  14.31 14.32 15.60 14.30  14.98
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4.4￿Costs and Benefits of Alternative Stock Options  
  Base Option 1 Option 2 Option 3  Option 4
 Net stock (million tons)  0.8  1.0 1.0 0.7  0.8 
 Total distribution (million tons)  1.8  1.8  2.0  1.8  1.85 
   
Total Net Outlay (billion Taka)  14.31 14.32 15.60 14.30 14.98
   
 Excess book value of FFW wages  -1.53 -1.79 -1.87 -1.50  -1.49
   
 Adjusted Net Outlay  15.84 16.11 17.47 15.80  16.46
   
 Marginal Net Outlay  0.00 0.27 1.63 -0.04  0.62
   
 Marginal Benefit*  0.00 -0.81 0.52 0.12  0.82
   
 Marginal Benefit / Marginal Net Outlay  -300% 32% -324%  131%
   
 Quality Loss in as % of Net Outlay  0.9% 6.5% 6.2% 0.0%  0.1%
   
Note: * Benefits equal the sum of the producer and consumer subsidies (relative to market prices). 





5.   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Foodgrain stocks serve dual purposes: they provide working stocks for routine 
distribution and they also serve as security stocks for emergency distribution.  However, 
increases in stock levels imply either increased distribution or quality losses.  The direct 
costs of increased distribution are clearly shown in the government accounts.  The costs 
to consumers of quality deterioration of PFDS foodgrain are not accounted for, however.  
Implicit losses to rice consumers due to quality deterioration were significant in 2000/01: 
about 1.05 billion Taka (about 19 million dollars), equal to 10.9 percent of total net 
outlay on rice of the PFDS.   
Closer attention to the quality of foodgrain in storage, and the tight link between 
size of stocks and the amount of distribution necessary to rotate stocks is needed.  Thus, 
decisions on procurement need to be taken in light of the potential costs of increased 
distribution and quality deterioration of stocks.  The accounting framework provided in 
this report can enhance this analysis by quantifying (even if only roughly) the hidden 
costs of quality losses for consumers. 
Further analysis of these issues might include taking into account the effects of 
distribution and procurement on market prices.   Other analysis might also be done on the 
costs of alternative minimum stocks for emergency distribution needs, (which were 
implicitly included in the analysis shown in the preceding sections through attention 
given to the minimum stock at any point of the year).   
Finally, the analysis shows that stock levels in 2000/01 were broadly consistent 





higher stocks and keeping distribution constant would entail substantial quality losses, 
unless alternative means of rotating stocks (e.g. through sales and purchases at open 
market prices at the wholesale levels) are adopted.
17  Holding lower stocks would result 
in minimum stock levels falling below currently perceived ￿safe￿ levels for emergency 
distribution needs.  Small changes in the stock levels, however, have relatively small 
effects on costs and benefits of the PFDS.  Maintaining good quality storage, effective 
stock management and minimizing leakage are more important determinants of the 
overall PFDS financial efficiency.   
                                                 
17 Likewise, maintaining stocks at 2000/01 levels with lower total distribution (as in 2002/03) also risks 
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Appendix 1￿Decomposition of Costs and Benefits of the PFDS 
 
This appendix presents an accounting framework for assessing the distribution of 
costs and benefits of the PFDS, including the valuation of stock.  
 
In quantity terms, closing stock (STK1) is equal to opening stock (STK0) plus total 
procurement (PROC) less stock losses (LOSS) and distribution (DIST).    
 
(1) STK1 = STK0 + PROC ￿ LOSS ￿ DIST 
 
Evaluating all flows at the Ministry of Food￿s full average financial cost of grain in the 
current year (P1)
 18,  
 
(2) P1 * STK1 = P1* STK0  +  P1*PROC  ￿  P1*DIST  ￿  P1*LOSS 
 
Actual distribution, however, takes place at a price of PC1,i, (which varies according to 
distribution channel DISTi), not at the economic price P1.
19  Adding and subtracting the 
value of distribution, and regrouping the terms, gives: 
 
(3) P1 * STK1 = P1* STK0  +  P1*PROC  ￿  ΣiPC1,i*DIST i  -  Σi(P1- PC1,i)*DIST i  
 
￿  P1*LOSS,  
 
where the term Σi (P1- PC1,i)*DIST i represents the total consumer subsidy on 
distribution. 
 
We can also rewrite the value of the initial stock (P1* STK0) at the current price P1 as the 
sum of the value of the initial stock at the previous period￿s prices and the change in 
value of the stock due to price changes: 
 
(4) P1* STK0  =  P0* STK0  + (P1 ￿ P0) * STK0  
 
The resulting equation for the value of foodgrain flows of the Ministry of Food is: 
 
(5) P1 * STK1  =  P0* STK0  + (P1 ￿ P0) * STK0  
 
                        +  P1*PROC  ￿  ΣiPC1,i*DIST i  -  Σi(P1- PC1,i)*DIST i  ￿  P1*LOSS, 
 
                                                 
18 This estimate of the full average financial cost of foodgrain (including an estimated value of food aid) is 
termed the ￿economic price￿ by the Government of Bangladesh.  This definition differs from the standard 
definition of an economic price, which reflects opportunity cost to the society, which is reflected in the 
market price (in the absence of policy or other distortions).       




Replacing the Ministry of Food￿s full average financial cost price (P1) in equation (5) 
with the average market wholesale price p1,
20 gives an equation for the value of foodgrain 
flows at wholesale market prices:  
 
(6) p1 * STK1  =  p0* STK0  + (p1 ￿ p0) * STK0  
 
                         +  p1*PROC  ￿  ΣiPC1,i*DIST i  -  Σi(p1- PC1,i)*DIST i  ￿  p1*LOSS, 
 
  Subtracting equation (6) from equation (5), (the value of the PFDS stocks and flows 
at market and at the GOB￿s financial prices, respectively), gives a decomposition of the 
costs of the PFDS in terms of the official consumer subsidy, the producer and consumer 
subsides evaluated using market prices, changes in valuation of stock, and other factors:  
 
(7) (P1 - p1)* STK1  =  (P0 - p0)*STK0  + [(P1 ￿ P0) * STK0 - (p1 ￿ p0) * STK0 ]   
 
+  (P1 - p1)*PROC   (an approximation of the total subsidy to producers)
21  
 
+  Σi(p1- PC1,i)*DIST i  (an approximation of the total economic subsidy to consumers) 
 
Σi(P1- PC1,i)*DIST i   (the financial cost of the PFDS to the GOB) 
 
￿ (P1 - p1)*LOSS  (the difference in the value of losses at market and GOB full cost 
prices). 
                                                 
20 This formulation uses the wholesale price to value both procurement and distribution.  As such it may 
overstate the true market price to producers and understate the true market price for consumers, though the 
extent of the overvaluation or undervaluation depends on the timing and location of procurement and 
distribution, issues that are not considered in the analysis here.     
21 Total procurement actually includes three components, domestic procurement, government commercial 
imports, and food aid.  By definition, the Ministry of Food￿s ￿economic price￿ is the average financial cost 
of this procurement, valuing food aid according to donor￿s stated values, and government commercial 
imports according to prices paid through commercial tenders.  However, because of quality differences and 
timing of procurement, the average wholesale price is only an approximation of the unit value of food aid 
and commercial imports.  Note that the calculations of the costs of the PFDS in economic prices presented 
in this paper assume that there is no difference between the official (financial) prices and economic prices 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3￿Summary of Stock Simulation Assumptions and Results 
   (thousand tons)    
Simulation
a  Base Option 1 Option 2 Option 3  Option 4
          
Change in Stock Level  0 200 200 -100 0
Change in Distribution  00 2 0 0 - 5 0  - 5 0
Opening and closing stock          
  Rice  400 500 500 350 350
  Wheat  400 500 500 350 450
  Total  800 1000 1000 700 800
          
Distribution          
  Rice  850 850 950 850 850
  Wheat  950 950 1050 900 900
  Total  1800 1800 2000 1750 1750
          
Procurement          
  Rice Procurement (aman)  400 400 450 425 425
  Rice Procurement (boro)  465 465 515 440 440
  Wheat Domestic  320 320 320 320 320
  Wheat Food Aid  550 550 550 550 550
  Wheat Public Imports  100 100 100 50 50
          
Old Stock
b          
  Rice (peak month)  January January February -- --
  Rice (amount)  42 142 148 0 0
  Wheat (peak month)  -- January January -- --
  Wheat (amount)  09 87 8 0  0
          
a In each scenario, normal annual storage losses of 15 thousand tons of rice and 20 thousand tons 
  of wheat are assumed.           
b In the base scenario, procurement and distribution are adjusted to minimize the amount of old stock; 
In other scenarios, no adjustments are made to the timing of the procurement or distribution relative to 
the base, except in Options 3 and 4 (where 50,000 tons of rice is shifted from boro procurement 
in May to aman procurement in January).       
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